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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1 OB AND RULE 1 OB-5.
A SUGGESTION FOR REPLACING THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVITY
A number of federal civil liability provisions protect investors from losses
due to improper conduct in connection with the sale or purchase of securities
in interstate commerce.' Recently, however, investors harmed in a variety
of ways have been able to rely more and more on a single provision of federal
law: section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 which authorizes
the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate rules and regulations
to prevent "manipulative and deceptive devices," and Rule l0b-5,8 the gen-
eral "anti-fraud" rule which was created thereunder. Though these provisions
do not specifically provide a private cause of action, the federal courts have
taken them to establish a civil remedy under which an injured investor may
sue.4 With the expanding use of Rule lOb-5 as a basis for civil suits, questions
have emerged and still remain unanswered as to the scope of liability under
the rule.
Federal regulation of transactions in securities emerged as part of the after-
math of the market crash of 1929. The Securities Act of 1933 was drafted
1. Securities Act §§ 11 and 12, 48 Stat. 82, 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. H 771,
771 (1958) ; and Securities Exchange Act §§ 9 and 18, 48 Stat. 889, 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78i and 77r (1958).
2. Securities Exchange Act § 10b, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78J(b) (1958).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
4. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Implied clvil
liability under Rule lOb-5 has been specifically upheld by the courts of appeals in the fol-
lowing circuits: Second Circuit, Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir,
1951); Third Circuit, Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fifth
Circuit, Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Sixth Cir-
cuit, Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Eighth Cir-
cuit, Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962) ; Ninth Circuit, Errion v. Connell, 236
F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) ; and Tenth Circuit, Estate Counseling Serv. Inc. v. Merrill Lynch
Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 303 F2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962).
In addition, dictum in other circuits and acceptance by federal district courts indicatea
an approval of the doctrine of implied civil liability under Rule lob-5. See, c.g., Nash v.
J. Arthur Warner & Co., 137 F. Supp. 615 (D. Mass. 1955) (First Circuit); Beury v.
Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954) (Fourth Circuit); and Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
On the subject of implied liability and Rule 10b-5, see generally Ruder, Pitalls in the
Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59
Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964); Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5 - A Reply, 59 Nw,
U.L. Rnv. 171 (1964); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963); Comment, The Prospects for Rule
X-ZOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
Section 17 of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q, is virtually
identical in language with Rule lob-5 except that it only applies to misdeeds in connection
with the sale of securities. While it has been relegated to a minor role as a source of n-
plied civil liability, perhaps because of its existence as part of the same act which provides
civil liability for misrepresentation between buyers and sellers, courts have sustained tho
right to sue exclusively under this provision. See, e.g., Newman v. Weinstein, CCH FrD.
SEc. L. REP. f[ 91422 (S.D. Ill. 1964).
RULE 1OB-5
primarily to provide the investor with full disclosure concerning new stock
issues;5 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed principally
to protect the investor against manipulation of stock prices through regulation
of transactions upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets and
to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed
on a national securities exchange. 6 Both acts provide the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) with an arsenal of enforcement powers 7 and the
individual with specific remedies to compensate him for damages which double
as an alternative mode of regulation.$
Under the Securities Act of 1933, civil liability is specifically imposed only
for misconduct in connection with the sale of a security.0 Section 12 of the act
establishes a cause of action in a purchaser against the seller if the stock sold
is not registered with the SEC [section 12(1)] 10 or if the seller misstates or
omits a material fact concerning the stock [section 12(2)].? Intent is not an
element of liability in the latter suit; it is only necessary that the purchaser
not know of the untruth or omission, that contractual privity exist and that
the seller "not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omis-
sion..."-2 If the registration statement necessary for the initial sale of stock
to the general public contains a material falsehood or omission, Section 11 of
the act allows the investor to sue every person instrumental in the initial sale
of the stock, including every person who signed the registration statement,
every director or partner of the company whose stock is covered by the reg-
istration statement, and every underwriter of the stock issue.'3 Under this
section, the issuer's liability is absolute. It is no defense that the exercise of
reasonable care could not have uncovered the untruth or omission; the only
defense is that the buyer knew of the untruth or omission at the time of his
acquisition of the security."4 The design of this section is to employ wide-
5. See HR. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933) (presidential message to
Congress).
6. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934) (presidential message to Con-
gress).
7. See, e.g., Securities Act §§ 8, 19 and 20, 48 Stat. 79, 85 and 86 (1933), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77h, 77s and 77t (1958); and Securities Exchange Act §§ 9, 19, and 21, 48
Stat. 889, 898 and 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78s and 78u (1958).
8. See note 1 supra.
9. 3 Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULAT oN 1719 (Zd ed. 1961).
10. Securities Act § 12(1), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77/(1)
(1958). See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1692-93.
11. Securities Act § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1958). See generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1699-1712.
12. Securities Act § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1958).
13. Securities Act § 11, 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958). See
generally 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1721-42.
14. The issuer is defined as "every person who issues or proposes to issue any secu-
rity" and includes all people in control of the issuer. Securities Act § 2(4), 48 Stat. 74
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ranging liability as an in terrorem technique to insure that full and honest
disclosure of all relevant material covering a new security will be provided
the investor.15
Although the Exchange Act of 1934 seems to have been framed primarily
to provide the SEC with a comprehensive regulatory role, it does contain
specific civil liability provisions to compensate the investor for losses caused
by certain manipulations of the market.16 In contrast to these specific and
narrow liability provisions, Section 10b has become the basis for a broadly
conceived remedy for defrauded investors. Evidencing greater comprehensive-
ness than the Securities Act by covering purchases as well as sales, the sec-
tion provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.' 7
Under this statutory power, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5, designed to
prohibit any possible impropriety in connection with the sale or purchase of
securities in interstate commerce:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.'
It does not seem to have been the conscious intent of Congress to provide
civil liability under Section 10b or the rules promulgated thereunder.10 Per-
haps the strongest intrinsic proof of this assertion lies in the fact that Section
9 of the same act explicitly provides civil liability for violation of such rules
(1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1958). For defendants other than the issuer,
such as underwriters and experts, an elaborate scheme of reasonable care and affirmative
defenses is present under § 11(b) of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1958).
15. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 173
(1933) ; Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE LJ. 227, 251 (1933);
and H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933).
16. Securities Exchange Act §§ 9 and 18, 48 Stat. 889 and 897 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78i and 78r (1958).
17. Securities Exchange Act § lob, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (b) (1958).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
19. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent 1,
57 Nw. U.L. Ray. 627 (1963) ; 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1757-97.
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as the SEC prescribes under the rulemaking power given it in the section.20
Thus a comparison of sections 9 and 10 suggests that Congress, which had
been so careful in drafting the act, did not intend to grant injured investors
a dvil remedy under the latter section. However, the federal courts have
so consistently read Section l0b and Rule lOb-5 to create an implied right
of action that no one now seriously challenges this result.2 '
Once having found civil liability under Rule lOb-5, courts were confronted
by the fact that the rule's language is so vague as to create an almost com-
pletely undefined liability. Who would be liable to whom and under what
drcumstances? All that the rule explicitly requires is that the defendant be
guilty of "misconduct" in connection with a purchase or sale of any securities.
Two limitations - that the plaintiff have suffered injury and that the de-
fendant's misconduct be the cause - are so obvious that everyone has ac-
cepted their presence as elements of a 10b-5 suit. Furthermore, in order to
limit recoverable damages to losses closely connected with securities trading,
courts have universally required that the plaintiff's injury result from his
purchase or sale of securities.2 Although the courts have long recognized
that these limitations provide only a general framework for a lOb-5 cause
of action and that further refinement is necessary, they have been unable to
fill this need.
I. THE FAiLuRE oF PrvTY
The requirement of privity was the major limitation on lOb-5 liability which
courts initially attempted to impose. The privity requirement was first sug-
gested in Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp.P (1951). In Farns-
worth the plaintiffs alleged that the individual defendants, directors of Fars-
worth Radio & Television Corp., had sold some of their stock in the corpora-
tion during the period from March 19 to October 30, 1948, while making
false statements about the company's inventory value and financial condition
and omitting to state publicly that the corporation had suffered substantial
20. Securities Exchange Act § 9, 48 Stat. 889 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78i
(1958).
21. See note 4 supra.
22. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). For a very recent
case, see Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., CCH FEB. SEc. L. REP. f 91433
(1964). Even this limitation has been expanded by allowing suits by representatives of the
actual buyer or seller. Pettit v. American Stock Fxch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(receivers in reorganization); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th
Cir. 1960) (trustee in bankruptcy); Slavin v. Germantow%,n Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799
(3d Cir. 1949) (stockholder's derivative suit).
For an analysis of the Birnbaum case which suggests the possibility that § 10(b) may
be read to afford protection for abuses in the securities trading process without limiting
the class of plaintiffs to buyers and sellers, see Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 725, 832-35 (1956). One difficulty with this analysis is that it confuses
the scope of SEC action with the desirable limits of civil liability.
23. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curians, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
See Note, 4 SrA. L. REv. 308 (1952).
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losses and that its inventory had become obsolete. In addition, the individual
defendants were charged with publishing on November 12, 1948, a statement
of the company's financial condition as of October 31, 1948, which was ma-
terially false and misleading. The plaintiffs claimed that they had purchased
Farnsworth stock from a third party on November 12 and December 13,
1948, thirteen and forty-four days, respectively, after the defendants had stopped
selling their securities. The complaint was dismissed.
As to the allegations of misinformation in the financial statement, the court
expressed no opinion, since the plaintiffs had failed to allege that their pur-
chases were made in reliance on the company report24 As to the alleged con-
tinuing fraud from March 19 to October 30, - the defendants' failure to
reveal adverse information about the company - it was held that the plain-
tiffs lacked the requisite "semblance of privity between vendor and purcliaser."' 2
The exact nature of this fatal deficiency was left uncertain in the opinion. The
court might have meant that the duty of corporate insiders under lOb-5 to
reveal information extends only to people with whom there is contractual
privity - a "face-to-face" relationship between buyer and seller.20 If this
were the case, a lOb-5 cause of action would never be available to plaintiffs
who bought or sold stock on a securities market where the anonymous nature
of the transactions and the absence of particular buyer-seller relationships
make it impossible to find privity of contract.27 On the other hand, the court
might have meant that the only persons to whom a duty of disclosure is owed
by an insider are those whose purchases (sales) of stock are contemporaneous
24. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
25. Ibid.
26. Cf. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). See Conant, Duties of Disclosure of
Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960).
27. A securities exchange does not involve buyer-seller relationships in a face-to-face
sense. The sale of a security through an exchange necessarily involves brokers, often In-
volves an elaborate process in which a "specialist" in the stock may act as a middleman
between brokers, or may involve a ritualistic bidding directly between brokers. See LtrmLrt
& FARWVLL, THE STocEmARx:r 190-96 (3d ed. 1963). In addition, once a sale Is agreed
upon between two brokers or between broker and specialist, stock certificates representing
the shares sold may never be exchanged between the broker-parties to a particular sale
on the floor of the exchange, because only net transfers of stock certificates actually occur
between brokerage firms. LEFFLER & FARWELL, supra at ch. 16.
The same conclusion is valid with regard to the operation of the "over-the-counter"
(OTC) market. While there is no one market place in the OTC market and most buslnegt
is conducted by telephone between brokerage firms, it would be fair to say that the same
degree of anonymity exists here as to the actual parties to the transaction. One difference
is that it is easier subsequently to ascertain the parties to a particular stock transaction
even though the same degree of fortuity exists here in the initial matching of buyers and
sellers. A factor which supports the proposition that it is impossible to speak of a buyer-
seller relationship is that many transactions are consummated between an individual and
a brokerage firm which has "taken a position" or is "making the market" in the particular
stock issue. See LEFF.ER & FARWELL, supra at 402-15.
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with the defendant's sales (purchases). It is possible to construe the court's
refusal to treat the case as a class action on behalf of all purchasers of Farns-
worth stock from March 1, 1948 to January 14, 1949, as resting upon the
fact that plaintiffs had not purchased securities during the period in which
defendants were selling, while unrepresented members of the alleged class
had. As the court pointed out, there were "obviously groupings of such purch-
asers within that period who do not share with... [plaintiffs] the common
questions of law or fact" required for such a representative action.O If this
distinction between the plaintiffs and other members of the alleged class was
the basis for the court's refusal to allow the action, then the court may have
considered contemporaneity sufficient to establish privity. Yet in spite of the
uncertain nature of the doctrine as introduced in Farnsworth, privity has been
understood by subsequent courts as privity of contract. This concept has
dominated judicial thinking concerning the limitation of liability under Rule
lOb-5. 30
In recent years, the overwhelming number of courts that have considered
the requirement of privity have discarded it as inappropriate. "11 One explana-
tion is that the requirement is made suspect by the fact that the Second Circuit,
28. For a rejection of this interpretation, see text accompanying notes 69-SO infra.
29. 99 F. Supp. at 705.
30. Thus, courts have dismissed cases where privity of contract ,ras not present. See,
e.g, Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 218 F. Supp. 274 (D.N.J. 1963) ; Donovan, Inc. v.
Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Calif. 1955) ; Citizens Cas. Co. v. Shields, CCH FED. Sc.
L. REP. It 90683 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). In most "10b-5" cases, however, privity of contract
exists between the parties and the issue is not considered. See, e.g, Straley v. Universal
Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961); Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266
F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp, 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
The court's approach in Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd,
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961), is illustrative of the impact which privity has had upon civil
liability under the federal securities laws. In establishing liability under the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, the court nevertheless felt it necessary to consider the apparent re-
quirement of privity. And reluctant to discard it completely, the court redefined the term
to allow suits between people not buyers and sellers in the same transaction:
... [P]rivity is not an ultimate or operative fact. It is an evidentiary fact to be
considered in conjunction with other material facts in determining whether the
relationship (such as it is) between the plaintiffs and the defendants and the nature
of the particular acts and transactions involve the duty created by statute.
194 F. Supp. at 230.
31. It appears that since 1960 courts have been more willing to allow suits where
privity of contract does not exist. See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dune, 307
F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A, CCH FED. S. L. REP. ff 91360
(E.D. Pa. 1964); Freed v. Szabo Food Service, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 91317
(N.D. Ill. 1964); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 32 U.SJ-L Wumc 2466 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v.
Channing Corp, 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Buchholtz v. Renard, 188 F. Supp.
888 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961) (under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
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which affirmed Farnsworth per curiam in 1952,32 had one year previously
decided a case in which privity of contract between the parties was lacking
but in which it had not mentioned this infirmity. In Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co. (1951)33 the plaintiffs, common stockholders of Raytheon, alleged
that they were induced to buy their shares by false and misleading statements
contained in a prospectus and registration statement issued in connection
with the initial sale of preferred stock. Although there was clearly no privity
of contract, since the defendant corporation was currently selling only pre-
ferred stock to the public and plaintiffs had purchased common stock in a
securities market, the court found liability under Rule lOb-5. Subsequent
courts seeking to avoid the requirement of privity have found solace in Fisch-
inan and viewed Farnsworth as limited to its particular fact situation.84
Another explanation for the rapid demise of privity is the determination
of courts to protect defrauded investors even when the provisions of the
Securities Act are inapplicable. In Fischman, for example, the court held
initially that under Section 11 of the 1933 Act an action for damages caused
by a false registration statement was unavailable because the section is ap-
plicable only to persons purchasing the securities covered by the registration
statement.35 After thus abandoning the only section of federal securities
regulation that explicitly created liability for false registration statements,
the court expanded Rule 10b-5 to take up the slack:
We think that when, to conduct actionable under Section 11 of the 1933
Act, there is added the ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes
actionable under §10b of the 1934 Act and the Rule, at the suit of any
defrauded person, whether or not he could maintain a suit under §11 of
the 1933 Act.36
As justification for this expansion the courts expressed the desire to close
an obvious statutory loop-hole, and thereby protect defrauded investors.
Otherwise, the court argued, a corporation could purposely use a false regis-
tration statement, apparently complying with the provisions of the 1933 Act,
in order to induce people to buy its common stock.8 7 The reaction of the
32. 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
33. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
34. See, e.g., Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (SD.NY,
1964) ; New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; Coch-
ran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
35. Securities Act § 11(a), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(1958) : "In case any part of the registration statement ... contained an untrue statement
of a material fact ... any person acquiring such security ... may, either at law or In
equity, in a court of competent jurisdiction, sue ...
36. 188 F.2d at 786-87.
37. Were this not true, Section 11 of the 1933 Act, designed to protect investors even
when there is no fraud, would afford a shelter or sanctuary for those who defraud in-
vestors. To illustrate:
A corporation and its "insiders" put out a prospectus and registration statement,
relating to a very small issue of preferred, which apparently complies with the
provisions of the 1933 Act but which, as they well know, is false; this they do with
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Fisclman court has proved characteristic of the judicial response to privity
in the lOb-5 context.37a Since imposition of a privity requirement would have
excluded almost all securities market transactions and would have limited
10b-5 suits to face-to-face transactions, civil liability under the rule would
have functioned only as an extension of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act
and would have covered those instances where the plaintiff had sold securities
following a misleading statement or omission. Thus as suits arose where privity
was absent, where liability could not be established under existing federal
law and where the court felt plaintiff was entitled to recovery, the courts ex-
plicitly or implicitly abandoned privity as an element of a 10b-5 cause of action.
Since privity is no longer a judicially acceptable concept in this area, the
task to which the privity requirement was addressed - that of fashioning
workable limits to liability under Rule 10b-5 - remains unfinished. For with-
out further definition civil liability under the rule will remain formless and
possibly unrelated to the policies of regulation and supervision inherent in
our federal securities laws. It might be suggested that successful delimitation
of the rule must await congressional action, and that until such time, courts
should abstain from elaborating on the scope of liability under Rule 1Ob-5.p
Counsels of non-action must expect to fall on deaf ears, however, if present
judicial attitude toward Rule 10b-5 is any indication. For the act of denying
all significance to the doctrine of privity was only the first step in the hap-
hazard judicial extension of civil liability under Rule l0b-5.39 And once this
extension began, the pace at which it continued seems only to have quickened.
the sucessful aim of fraudulently inducing some investors to purchase the prelerred
from the company but also other investors to purchase a much larger amount of the
company's common from the "insiders:' The fraud-doers would be delighted to re-
imburse the purchasers of the small amount of the preferred and to avoid liability
to the defrauded purchasers of the large amount of the common.
188 F.2d at 787.
37a. Other courts have found solace in the existence of an apparent "lacuna" which re-
quires correction. See, e.g., Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir.
1962):
It was not necessary that there be privity between plaintiff and the defendants in the
sale of the bonds .... If this were not so the issuers and brokers could easily evade
liability under the law because it is well known that the original purchasers of the
securities do not always retain them as permanent investments and that the public
trades in securities.
Freed v. Szabo Food Service, Inc., CCH FED. Sac. L REP. 91317 (N.D. Ill. 1964):
[If privity were applied, it] would allow a corporation whose stock is issued public-
ly to make misrepresentations concerning the stock without any fear of liability so
long as its stock was only sold to the public by underwriters or others. Such a rule
would ignore realities of the public securities market and such was certainly not the
intention of Congress.
38. See Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by
Implication Through Rule lob-5, 59 Nw. U.L R-v. 185 (1964).
39. See, e.g, New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
discussed in text accompanying notes 87-92 infra; Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F.
Supp. 21 (SMD.N.Y. 1963), discussed in note 86 infra.
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At first glance, it might be thought that the civil liability provisions of both
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act would provide a pattern against
which Rule 10b-5 might be measured. However, the wide variety of actions
provided by these sections, each with different and often inconsistent elements
necessary to establish liability, affords no assistance because there is no ra-
tional reason to select one provision over another as the appropriate model.
There seems to be no way, for example, to choose between the models offered
by Section 11 of the Securities Act, with its absolute liability provisions for
misstatements in a registration statement,40 and Section 18 of the Exchange
Act where liability is imposed only for intentional misstatements in the periodic
report submitted to the SEC.41 And since courts have apparently found it
necessary to establish implied civil liability under the rule, the conclusion
must be drawn that they were dissatisfied with existing remedies and thus
unwilling to frame lob-5 suits as mere equivalents to the already existing
civil liability sections of both acts.
But to say that the federal securities acts are inadequate sources of definition
does not mean that the search for appropriate limits to liability in lOb-5 suits
is necessarily directionless. Principles of common law, which courts relied
upon to justify the derivation of civil liability from the rule in the first in-
stance, would seem to provide a most helpful analogue in the task of shaping
the dimensions of the suit. The existence in the federal securities laws of such
undefined terms as "fraud" and "misconduct" indicate that these terms were
expected to be understood against the background of common law. Any other
view would imply a lack of legislative direction and would leave the definition
of these important concepts to the random development of sporadic litigation.
Indeed, it seems only reasonable to expect that both Congress and the SEC,
the drafters of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5, legislated against the backdrop
of the common law with common law definitions and principles in mind. But
while the common law may provide a conceptual framework for exegesis
of Rule 10b-5, it cannot by itself accommodate the potentially conflicting in-
terests which may be involved in regulation of transactions in securities. Nor
can it resolve such issues as whether compensation should only be remedial
- a concept which seems to require a causal link between defendant's conduct
and plaintiff's damage - or should also perform a deterrent, regulatory func-
40. See note 13 supra.
41. 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1958). Under this provision,
the burden is upon the defendant to establish lack of intent: liability for a misstatement
shall exist "unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading."
42. Thus, almost all courts which have considered the basis for a cause of action under
10b-5 have placed reliance upon the common law principle, embodied in 2 5sArr.NT,
ToRTs § 286 (1934), that civil liability should exist against the violator of a legislative or
administrative enactment who causes harm to the interest intended to be protected by the
enactment. See, e.g., McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 836 (3d Cir. 1961); Ellis
v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282
F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960).
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tion - a concept which might only insist upon proof of undesirable conduct 4A3
As a consequence, definitions of the scope of Rule lOb-5 drawn from common
law analysis may have to be adjusted to harmonize with the policies of the
federal legislative scheme and with considerations of the business realities
dictated by the exigencies of the national securities markets.
As a preliminary step in analysis a distinction must be drawn between in-
tentional and negligent misconduct suits. Assuming for the moment that both
causes of action may be brought under Rule 10b-5, the appropriate scope of
liability seems to depend upon the characterization of the defendant's wrong.
For example, if the gravamen of a complaint is negligence, the defendant's
liability should depend upon whether a court finds that he owed a duty of
care to the plaintiff.4 On the other hand, if intentional misconduct is alleged,
questions of duty of care seem irrelevant in the light of traditional tort prin-
ciples; rather limitations on liability should be sought in such principles as
the requirement that the plaintiff's injury be a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the defendant's act.45 Since this distinction is important in estab-
lishing the scope of liability under Rule 10b-5, any discussion of civil lia-
bility must be divided into categories of intentional and negligent misconduct,
and the characteristics of each must be treated separately.
II. INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT 40
A. Liability for Deceptive Statements: The Elements of a 10b-5 Suit.
The least troublesome situation in which the courts have abandoned the
requirement of privity is one in which the plaintiff and defendant are indirectly
related through a traceable line of buyers and sellers. For example, A issues
a security which is sold by B to C, who in turn sells it to D, and so on. If
privity were applied strictly, each buyer (or seller) could sue only the seller
(or buyer) immediately preceding him in the direct line of transactions. As-
suming that A is the real wrongdoer and D the person ultimately injured, it
seems absurd to force D to sue C, C to sue B, and B to sue A.47
43. See text accompanying notes 77-86 infra.
44. 65 C.J.S. Negligence, § 4 (1950).
45. See, e.g., PROSsEa, TORTS 717-19 (3d ed. 1964) ; Keeton, The Ambit of a Fraudu-
lent Representor's Responsibility, 17 TEXAs L. REv. 1 (1938).
46. In considering the principles of liability under Rule 10b-5 for intentional miscon-
duct, it will always be assumed that there is sufficient proof to establish that the defendant
knew that what he said or omitted to say was deceptive or incorrect and that he intended
to deceive people by this conduct. For purposes of analysis, the discussion will be separated
into three categories: (1) where the defendant made statements which contained falsehoods
or which were deceptive because incomplete; (2) where the defendant's wrong is in his
complete silence; (3) where the defendant's misconduct is directed towards the corpora-
tion of which he is an officer or director.
47. The need of successive suits, each charging a breach of warranty between the
parties to a given transaction, was obviated generally in the case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Cars, Inc., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Cf. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319
Mass. 92, 64 N.E2d 693 (1946). It would seem strange to impose such a requirement on
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In Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne 48 the ultimate purchaser of
municipal bonds brought a 10b-5 action against the agents of the original
seller. The agent had sold bonds issued by the city of West Buechel to Jack
Cage & Co. Cage had paid partially in cash but he executed installment notes
for the principal amount of the bonds, payable either in cash or by return of
the revenue bonds. Cage, however, sold the bonds for face value to third
persons, thus leaving his debt to the city unsecured. Since payment of the
principal and interest on the bonds was to be made from revenues on the im-
provements to be constructed with the money raised by the bonds, the actual
value of the bonds to any holder was entirely contingent upon Cage's fulfill-
ment of his obligation to the city. Given Cage's financial unreliability, 40 the
bonds were virtually worthless. Plaintiff sued the city's agent, claiming that
it had intentionally omitted to state material facts (the terms of the sale to
Cage) necessary to make the prospectus which accompanied the bonds not
misleading. Defendant sought to plead in bar that there was no privilty, but
the court replied:
The fraud permeated and affected the entire issue of bonds which de-
fendants placed in the channels of trade and any purchaser had a right
to rely on the prospectus and the provisions of bonds. It was not necessary
that there be privity between plaintiff and defendants in the sale of the
bonds .... If this were not so the issuers and brokers could easily evade
liability under the Law because it is well known that the original pur-
,chasers of the securities do not always retain them as permanent invest-
ments and that the public trades in securities.60
The court's willingness to allow the plaintiff's suit to reach the real wrongdoer
is in keeping with a policy of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Both
acts, for example, extend application of all civil liability provisions to "con-
trolling persons," those really responsible for the wrongdoing of the "con-
trolled person" who would otherwise be liable to the plaintiff,51 even if the
"controlling person" would not be liable under principles of agency alone.
And. Section 11 of the Securities Act would have allowed Texas Continental
to sue the city's agent directly for omissions in the prospectus,"2 but for the
"10b-5" suits, especially when the issue is intentional fraud and not the breach of a war-
ranty established in the relationship between parties.
48. 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
49. Another example of the misdeeds of BenJack Cage may be found in Hooper v,
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), where he arranged for the issu-
ance of corporate stock in exchange for worthless assets. Cage has led quite a notorloug
career and belongs to that small coterie of people who have sought refuge from charges
of corporate embezzlement and theft in Brazil. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1959, § 1, p. 14, col, 8.
50. 307 F.2d at 249.
51. Securities Act § 15, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1958), and
Securities Exchange Act § 20, 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1958). See Smith v.
Bear, 237 F2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane,
85 F. Supp. 104, 121-24 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
52. The activities of the Dunne brothers and the Bankers Bond Co., the original
agents, were such as to bring them under the general definition of an underwriter, § 2(11)
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fact that municipal bonds are not covered by the sectionrI3 Since Rule lOb-5
has been interpreted to reach fraud generally, suits under it should not be
subject to the more specific limitations of the Securities Act; thus the court's
extension of lOb-5 to cover municipal bonds was appropriate.
It is possible to eliminate privity as a requirement for a straight line trans-
action suit without considering more appropriate limitations, because the
nature of the straight line transaction inherently limits the liability to which
a defendant will be exposed. Defendant can foresee the extent of his potential
liability, since it cannot exceed the price at which he sold the stock (or, if
he was a purchaser, the true value of the stock). And the liability of the de-
fendant is limited to those persons at whose expense he sought personal profit.
While the result in Texas Continental thus seems perfectly acceptable, the
ease with which the court dismissed the relevance of privity is characteristic
of the totally negative treatment which that doctrine has recently received."
Returning to Fischman, it seems clear under the principles of intentional
tort - a proper source of doctrine if Rule lOb-5 is to function as a general
prohibition against fraud in securities transactions - that it would have been
inappropriate in that case to have barred the suit for want of privity between
the parties. The fact that the plaintiffs paid heed to the statements in the pros-
pectus is very understandable, and the, defendant company could hardly have
failed to realize that third persons such as the plaintiffs would be injured by its
fraudulent misstatements. Because a prospectus is based upon the registration
statement submitted to the SEC,.all reasonable investors expect the prospectus
to contain the most accurate information available, elaborately prepared under
SEC supervision, and review. The crucial importance of the prospectus as a
source of information for investors dictates that it must not be misused with
impunity. Since the plaintiffs could establish that they were justified in relying
on the defendant's misleading statements, that the defendant bad caused them
6f the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I1) (195S), and
theieby subject them'to liability under § ll(a) (5), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15
U.S.C.§ 77k(a) (5) (1958): -"
53. The sale of municipal bonds is exempted from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act under § 3(a)(2), 48 Stat. 75 (1933),.as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2)
(1958). On'the right to bring suits under Rule 10b-5 for transactions in securities ex-
empted by the Securities Act, see, e.g., Greenwich Say. Bank v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
54. See, e.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L Rzp. ff 91360
(E:D. Pa. 1964):
.. privity, as such, is not a prerequisite to a right of action under that section
[§ 10b]. In my judgment, it would be an unwarranted constriction of the broad pro-
tection contemplated by the federal scheme of securities regulation to engraft upon
that scheme a requirement that is neither a part of the statute nor a part of the gov-
erning common tort law principles.
Freed v. Szabo Food Services, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 91317 (N.D. IlL 1964);
Cochran v. Channing Corp, 211 F. Supp. 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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harm, and that their reliance was foreseeable, a sufficient basis for liability
under common law principles exists."
In opposition to the results in both Fischman and Texas Continental, it
might be argued that if the Securities Act specifically omits to provide civil
liability, then this barrier to liability should be transposed to lOb-5 suits under
the 1934 Act. Thus the inapplicability of Section 11 and the privity require-
ment of Section 12(2) might be carried over to bar both suits. But it is no
derogation of Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, which require at most a
finding of negligence, if Rule lOb-5, a prohibition of fraudulent behavior, with
its elevated degree of fault and its additional elements in the cause of action,
is taken to establish liability for intentionally false statements. It is sufficient
explanation for the result that if Rule lOb-5 provides a distinct source of
civil liability, these cases represent the classic format for a common law suit
charging fraud.
Another possible argument against reading Rule lOb-5 as a general anti-
fraud provision is that under this view the rule would be merely a federal
replica of the common law suit for fraud. Since securities fraud suits may be
brought in state courts, one might suppose that it is unnecessary for federal
courts to give dimension to Rule lOb-5 as an analogue to the common law
remedy.56 But several reasons militate against this view. In the first place,
the introduction of federal law into the area of securities transactions was
designed to provide uniform, nationwide regulation over a matter of national
concern, 57 a goal which the diverse state laws by their very nature could not
achieve. Viewed in this light, one goal of the federal securities law should
be to allow similarly situated plaintiffs to recover no matter what their resi-
dence or the situs of their transaction. In addition, the usefulness of state
remedies is limited by their generality. They are designed to apply to a wide
variety of fraud situations, and cannot be expected to be flexible enough to
adapt to the peculiar circumstances of securities fraud. Nor would it be ac-
curate to state that Rule lOb-5 is but a mirror image of the common law suit,
The case law of states differs regarding when, if ever, persons buying or selling
stock owe a duty to make full disclosure of material facts, and whether failure
55. On the requisites of a common law action of deceit, the form which a suit for
fraud assumes, see Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337, 374 (1889) ; HARPER & JAMES, Tus LAv
OF TORTS ch. 7 (1956). On the inapplicability of the requirement of privity in common law
fraud suits, see Note, 4 STAN. L. REV. 308 (1952).
56. Both Acts are specific in allowing additional rights and remedies under state law.
Securities Act § 16, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1958), and Secu-
rities Exchange Act § 28, 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1958). See Independence
Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rezd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 282
(1940). In addition, jurisdiction of suits in equity and at law brought to enforce liability
under the Securities Act is concurrent with state courts. Securities Act § 22, 48 Stat, 86
(1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1958).




to fully disclose is within the reach of an action for fraud.58 Federal law, on
the other hand, by exclusively focusing upon securities problems, is in a
better position to develop doctrines more responsive to the particular cir-
cumstances of securities cases. As a consequence, either a partial or complete
omission to state a material fact in connection with any securities transaction
gives rise to liability under 10b-5. Such considerations suggest that the fed-
eral courts should feel free to exercise jurisdiction under 10b-5 and to elaborate
this cause of action, even when concurrent state remedies are available.
In the cases so far considered, in addition to the defendant's intentional
misconduct, there has been justifiable reliance upon the part of the plaintiff
which could be said to have been foreseeable, and the defendant's conduct was
the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. These three elements - justifiable
reliance, foreseeability, and causation - are part of the action for deceit, the
common law suit for fraud,59 and no one doubts that liability under Rule
10b-5 is established when they are present. The important question, however,
in defining the elements of a lOb-5 suit is whether all three are necessary
to the cause of action. It might be suggested that the requirement that the
defendant's conduct be the cause of damages is redundant so long as reliance
and foreseeability are present. In fact, most commentators equate reliance in
a fraud action with causation 60 and discuss foreseeabiity as the crux of a
finding of proximate cause.61 There may be situations, however, in which
defendant's statement is not the cause of the plaintiff's injury, even though
reliance and foreseeability are proven. For example, the defendant, a corporate
officer, falsely informs some of the shareholders, of whom the plaintiff is one,
that the financial prospects of their company are very bleak in the hope that
they will sell their stock, thus depressing the price of the stock and allowing
the defendant to -purchase below the current market price. Plaintiff responds
to this statement by calling his stockbroker and directing him to sell the next
day. Unknown to our hypothetical plaintiff, a fire occurs in the company's
main plant that night, causing destruction of irreplaceable assets. This disaster
prompts other shareholders, many of whom are ignorant of defendant's mis-
statements, to sell, and the price of the stock plummets before plaintiff's sale
is consumated. Arguably no liability should exist because the intervening
event is an independent and effective cause of the damage to plaintiff and all
other shareholders. For plaintiff to carry his burden of proving how much
of his damage was caused by defendant's conduct rather than the disaster
58. For cases in which such duty is said not to exist, see, e.g, Gardner v. Baldi, 24
N.J. Super. 228, 93 A.2d 644 (Ch. 1952); Goodwin v. AgassiZ, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E.
659 (1933); Seitz v. Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266 (1922). As to where the duty
does exist, see, e.g., Hotchldss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932) (Kansas rule);
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (special circumstances rule).
59. See note 55 supra.
60. See, e.g., PRossem, ToRTs 729 (3d ed. 1964).
61. See, e.g., 2 HARPm & JAmEs, LAw OF ToRTs § 20.5 (1956) ; PsossvR, Toms § 50
(3d ed. 1964).
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is a seemingly impossible task. Thus, although proof of reliance may always
establish that defendant caused the plaintiff's conduct, as it did in our ex-
ample, it will not always suffice to establish that the plaintiff's injuries were
caused by the defendant's conduct.
Since causation is conceptually distinguishable from reliance, it may be
questioned whether reliance should be treated as a necessary element of a
lOb-5 cause of action. Suppose, for example, that the defendant, the president
of X corporation, in order to depress the price of its stock for his own benefit,
reports that the company, which is actually very prosperous, is on the verge
of bankruptcy. In accordance with the defendant's expectations, shareholders
of X corporation sell their stock and its price drops. Plaintiff, a shareholder
of the corporation who does not know of the defendant's statements, sells his
stock at a depressed price solely because of the sharp decline in its price and
later claims damages when the defendant's misstatements are discovered. Even
assuming that the damage to plaintiff is foreseeable, the imposition of the
requirement of reliance would bar a Rule lOb-5 suit in the foregoing example,
despite the fact that the defendant's conduct was calculated to drive the price
down to his benefit and that this conduct caused plaintiff's sale. Since the
essence of the defendant's wrongdoing is improperly inducing people to sell
stock, a failure to impose iabilit seems anomalous. Reliance thus emerges
as a requirement which, if substituted completely for causation, would bar
suits where causation is present 'while alowing suits in which the defendant
is not responsible for plaintiff's injury. Although in most cases of misrepresen-
tation the concepts of causation and reliance would produce the same result, it
would seem necessary to abandon reliance as an essential requirement and
to treat reliance as a subctegory of causation in order to impose lOb-5 lia-
bility only when the defendant's conduct is the actual cause of harm to the
plaintiff.
If causation is to be the necessary ingredient in a 10b-5 suit for fraud, the
next logical question is whether or not the plaintiff's conduct must be reason-
able. Most generally, this is analogous to the question of whether contributory
negligence should bar an action for fraud. The more specific issue of whether
plaintiff's reliance must be justifiable - the most common form of the general
question - is highlighted by the recent case of Freed v. Soabo Food Service,
Inc.62 Plaintiffs had bought stock in defendant's corporation after reading de-
fendant's predictions that high future earnings would follow the consumma-
tion of a prospective merger. When final earnings after the merger were an-
nounced, months after the glowing reports had been issued, they were only
one-half the predicted level. While the plaintiff's conduct in Siabo was argu-
ably unreasonable,6 the court sustained the plaintiff's cause of action, holding
that all that is necessary for a 10b-5 suit is that the plaintiff allege reliance
upon the misstatements by the defendant, purchase of securities, and resulting
62. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91317 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
63. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
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injury.64 Apparently the court implicitly assumed that the plaintiffs were en-
titled to rely upon casual predictive statements by corporate executives. Yet
it is one thing to rely on a company's required annual report to the SEC as
an indication of its state of being, and quite a different matter to rely on un-
official prediction, especially when optimism pervades all earnings forecasts
arid when any reasonable investor would discount their value. If only the reason-
ableness of the plaintiff's reliance is considered, there seems little reason to
afford relief. However, when, as in Szabo, a defendant is accused of having
sought to profit by the gullibility of investors and when it was foreseeable
that some would heed the defendant's predictions, there seems no reason why
he should not be held accountable for the injury he causes. Indeed, the Szabo
court, in ignoring the reasonableness of plaintiff's reliance, was merely follow-
ing the more recent fraud cases which have abandoned the requirement that
plaintiff's reliance be justifiable and thus was complying with the more gen-
eral doctrine that contributory negligence is no defense to an intentional tortSc5
While the requirement of reliance may be subsumed under the more gen-
eral category of causation, proof of causation alone may not be sufficient to
establish lOb-5 liability. Principles of common law also suggest that consider-
ation must be taken of the concept of proximate cause, which may be said
to limit liability before the chain of causally related events is followed to its
end.66 In the context of a. lOb-5 suit, the requirement of foreseeability fulfills
this function, since it would delete from the class of possible plaintiffs those
whose harm may be said to have been caused by the defendant, but who some-
how are too remote.6 7 Not only would mechanical application of tort doctrine
64. Freed v. Szabo Food Serv, Inc., CCH FED. Sac. L. rEP. f 91317 at p. 94,363-4
(N.D. Ill. 1964).
65. See cases cited in PRossEa, ToRts 731-34 (3d ed. 1964). Cf. Annotation, 27
A.L.R. 2d 14, 68 (1953).
66. 2 HARPmE & JAims, LAw oF ToRTs §§ 20.4-20.6 (1956).
Furthermore, the firmly established limitation that the plaintiff in a lOb-5 suit be dam-
aged from the purchase or sale of securities indicates that there are policies within the
federal scheme of regulation which sometimes require that suits be prevented even though
causation be shown. Without such a limitation, suits could be brought by plaintiffs who
were totally removed from transactions in securities and whose only damages vere, for
example, poor health or lost jobs. But since it would be fair to characterize federal secu-
rities law as concerned only with insuring full disclosure and preventing misconduct in
connection with securities transactions, there would seem no justification for allowing suits
under lob-5 where the plaintiff did not purchase or sell securities and thereby extending
protection beyond the already prescribed limits of both the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act See note 22 supra.
67. See note 61 supra.
Purposely omitted from consideration is any discussion of the different types of fore-
seeability. For example, foreseeability as a method of limiting liability might extend to
the class of plaintiffs or it might ex-tend to the nature of the harm, or both. The reason
for such an omission is that the area of law is still in ferment, dating back to Palsgraf v.
Long Island RI, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928), and no generally accepted answer has emerged.
For a very recent judicial discussion, see Judge Friendly in In re Kinsman Transit Co.,
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suggest such a requirement, but the rationale of this limitation would seem
equally persuasive in the context of a lOb-5 suit. Normally it is thought
that an unlimited concept of causation would involve a court or jury in the
difficult and speculative task of deciding whether a plaintiff's harm was in fact
caused by the defendant's actions or whether intervening factors were re-
sponsible for the result. A requirement of foreseeability, however, would re-
move much of the speculative and metaphysical aspect of tracing an attenuated
chain of causation and would make more certain the determination that the
defendant was the actual cause of the plaintiff's harm. Nor can it be argued
that a requirement of foreseeability will substantially lessen the deterrent effect
of Rule 10b-5 civil liability suits. If the defendant has intended to deceive a
specific class of people - e.g., the shareholders of a particular corporation -
deterrence will be present since suits may be brought by every member of the
foreseeable class of plaintiffs as long as the defendant has caused them harm.
To add to this deterrent factor, which may be limited to a specific number
of suits but is not limited in amount of damages, the threat of suits by non-
foreseeable plaintiffs would not seem to increase the in terrorcrn nature of
Rule 10b-5. Defendants contemplating willful breach of the rule are hardly
likely to worry about plaintiffs whose causes of action would be based on
extended and speculative causative claims.
B. Liability For Failure To Disclose: Insider Trading With
Special Knowledge.
Liability under Rule 10b-5 may exist not only for intentional misstatements
on the part of individuals but also for total silence when the defendant has
been charged with an obligation to disclose certain facts; for example, lia-
bility may be thought to exist under 10b-5 if the defendant trades in stock
using inside information which he should have made public.08 The significant
problems which emerge in a lOb-5 suit based on a total failure to disclose
information are whether any plaintiff has suffered damage and, if so, whether
the defendatit caused the damage. While foreseeability would still remain as
a required element in the cause of action, the concept of reliance, which in the
case of misrepresentation provides one route to a finding of causation, seems
inappropriate. The potential plaintiff often will have knowledge only of silence;
he may have no awareness of whether insiders or the corporation are trading
in the market. Reliance on such silence would surely be misplaced. But in
addition, focusing on reliance rather than causation prevents an accurate analy-
sis of the nature of plaintiff's harm and its casual relationship with defendants'
conduct.
33 U.S.L. WEmc 2225 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1964). See also Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v,
Morts Dock & Engineering Co. (The Wagon Mound), [1961] 1 All E.R. 404; Doughty
v. Turner Mfg. Co., [1964] 2 W.L.R. 240 (C.A.).
68. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); Ward La France Truck Corp.,




In general, there are two fact situations in which the failure to disclose
information may involve a breach of lOb-5: first, where the defendant has
traded with inside knowledge and, second, where the corporation has purposely
withheld information in order to deceive the investing public. The Farnsworth
case, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs GO presents the first fact
pattern. In Farnsworth plaintiffs purchased stock in the company of which
defendants were officers, contemporaneously with sales by defendants who
failed to reveal adverse information about their company. The impropriety
of defendant's action in Farnsworth under Rule lOb-5 has been described in
another context by former SEC Chairman Cary in the following terms:
Where an insider has possession of facts that are known to him by virtue
of his status and that, if known generally, would tend materially to affect
the price of the security, the law requires that the insider disclose these
facts to those with whom he deals or forego the transaction.70
Thus the insider's duty is framed in the alternative; either he must disclose
or he must refrain from trading. The duty to disclose is wholly dependent
upon his trading activities.
The breach of this duty created by Rule lOb-5 is, however, insufficient to
establish liability. Causation must also be proven; it must be shown that the
plaintiff would not have been harmed if the defendant had not breached his
lOb-5 duty. In fact, this is not the case. The faceless nature of the securities mar-
ket makes it totally unrelated to the plaintiff's loss whether the defendant has
breached his duty by trading without disclosing information or has complied
with his lOb-5 duty by both not revealing any information and not trading n
In the hypothetical based on Farnsworth, for example, the investor who bought
at prices which did not reflect the unrevealed adverse information would have
had to suffer his loss if no insider had happened to be selling stock contempo-
raneously. In the same situation, the fact that an insider might later be found
to have been trading without revealing the information would not affect the
damages suffered by the plaintiff. The plaintiff would have bought his stock
at the market price if defendant had not been selling and his injury would
have been exactly the same.
'the cause of the damage to the investor is, in effect, an unknovn turn of
events in the affairs of the corporation, which is later reflected in the market
price of its stock. Depending upon whether a potential plaintiff happens to be
buying or selling, he will be upset at the particular time the corporation chooses
to reveal this information. Thus a seller might complain that adverse information
was announced prematurely, or a buyer that the announcement vas unduly
delayed. No matter when the information is released, someone will be hurt. 2
69. The use of the term "plaintiffs" here is meant to cover those represented members
of the initial class action in Farnsworth who purchased contemporaneously with the de-
fendants' sales and who were disassociated from the actual plaintiffs. See note 31 supra.
70. Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 COALI. L. Rsv. 403, 415 (1962).
71. See note 27 supra.
72. The reluctance of a corporation to immediately reveal all information which may
affect the market price of its stock is both understandable and justifiable. Such reticence
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In this situation, it would seem absurd to turn a damaged person into a plain-
tiff merely because of the fortuity that an insider happened to be trading.
Given the alternative formulation of the insider's duty - either to disclose
or to forego the transaction - we must conclude that no civil liability under
10b-5 should be imposed upon an insider who fails to disclose information
about his corporation, even though he is buying or selling stock in the corpo-
ration and thereby profiting by his non-disclosure. To impose liability would
be to tax the insider with responsibility for an injury which his misconduct
did not cause.73
It should not be presumed from the preceding analysis that no cause of
action will ever exist under 10b-5 when a defendant-insider has failed to
reveal material information about the affairs of the corporation. Thus, when
the plaintiff has bought or sold securities in a face-to-face transaction with the
defendant, plaintiff's loss occurs only because the defendant provided the stod
to be purchased while withholding information - a clear breach of Rule
10b-5.74 In this fact situation causation will be present to the extent that de-
fendant's conduct induced plaintiff's purchase or sale; had defendant not
breached his duty, plaintiff would have suffered no loss.
The second fact situation in which failure to disclose information may in-
volve an actionable breach of lOb-5 is where the corporation wrongfully with-
holds information from the trading public. Although no court has imposed
an obligation upon a corporation under Rule lOb-5 not to withhold material
information without a valid business reason, such a duty can be derived from
the specific reporting requirements and the underlying theme of "full dis-
closure" found in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. This duty
should not be confused with the requirement imposed under lb-5 on an
insider, who does not have responsibility for the dissemination of corporate
information, either to not trade in the stock or to reveal the information if
may be consistent with a company policy to refrain from touting the company's perform-
ance between official reports to the stockholders and to the SEC in order to prevent numer-
ous fluctuations in the stock's price as a result of frequent, and perhaps premature, "prog-
ress reports."
73. A further objection to permitting civil liability for insider-trading is the inherent
difficulty in establishing the plaintiff's losses. Under one theory, the loss to a plaintiff who
purchased stock before the release of adverse information should be measured by the dif-
ference between the price at which the stock was purchased and the price at which the stock
would have been purchased had the adverse news been released prior to the purchase. The
establishment of this hypothetical, "would have been, if" price presents serious problems of
proof. But more significantly, this basis for computing damages is not the only alternative,
and it may be appropriate to take into consideration that the investor might not have
bought the particular stock if the adverse information had been released. It might be
argued even that he should receive expectation damages for the profits he might have
made.
74. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Cf. Strong v,
Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) ; Broffe v. Horton, 172 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1949); Uotchklss
v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932). Contra, Gardner v. Baldi, 24 N.J. Super,
228, 93 A2d 644 (Ch. 1952).
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he is trading. The corporation's duty, in contrast, would be a continuing ob-
ligation which would not be contingent upon any stock trading by insiders.
However, proof of breach of this corporate duty to disclose will be difficult
because of the existence of a legal presumption favoring corporate decisions
under the rubric of the "business judgment rule" ; it can be e.xpected that
few successful challenges will be made to a corporation's decision to withhold
information unless self-profiting motives are found to attach to the corporate
decision postponing the release of information. Cochran v. Channing Corp.70
illustrates a situation where the business judgment rule could be overcome
because of the existence of self-profiting motives in the form of insider trading.
In Cochran it was alleged that defendant-insiders, desiring to purchase stock
in their corporation at a deflated price, purposely lowered the dividend rate
and withheld favorable information. By not releasing the favorable informa-
tion and by actively inducing people to sell who might not otherwise have
done so, defendants were undoubtedly the cause of the injury suffered by
the plaintiffs.
The preceding analysis of the insider trading issue might be challenged
on the ground that, so long as there is neither action by corporate officials to
prevent the dissemination of material information nor a "face-to-face" trans-
action between plaintiff and defendant, insiders will be able to trade freely
and profit by inside information without the threat of civil liability under
the rule.77 However, the adoption of a deterrent theory and the consequent
prohibition of all insider trading under 10b-5 could only be achieved, in accord
with our analysis, by abandoning the requirement of causation. But, such
an abandonment would do violence to the logical underpinnings of implied
civil liability under Rule 10b-5. Courts, in justifying the use of the rule as
a basis for civil liability have usually relied upon a tort theory.78 This theory,
75. Cf. Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 232, 43 N.E.2d 18, 19-20 (1942). See also
Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 40 Micii. L. Rv. 1125,
1128-31 (1942); Uhlman, The Duty of Corporate Directors to Exercise Business Judg-
vient, 20 B.U.L. REv. 488 (1940).
76. 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
77. In rebuttal, the fear of publicity itself may act as a barrier to insider-trading.
Knowledgeable corporate directors seem fully aware of the bad public relations which the
appearance of trading with inside information may cause, and may act to prevent the im-
putation of such conduct to themselves. Thus, when a monthly SEC report on changes in
stockholdings by officers and directors (the information is required by § 16a of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958)), was released a short
while ago and it appeared that two directors and an officer of Texas Gulf Sulphur had
bought stock before the announcement of the discovery of a major ore deposit in Canada,
each officer and director was very eager to explain his purchase and disassociate himself
from any impropriety. Thus one said ". . . I wouldn't dream of buying stock before the
news got out. . :' and revealed that his purchase was made "in the afternoon long after
the public announcement!'; and another justified his purchases, prior to the announcement
of the ore discovery, on public information concerning certain other favorable events for
Texas Gulf Sulphur. Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1964, p. 15, coL 2.
78. See note 42 supra.
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based upon section 286 of the Restatement of Torts,70 requires that if a legis-
lative enactment is violated, then the wrongdoer is liable for damages if "the
violation is the legal cause of the invasion." Thus the theoretical basis for
lOb-5 civil liability would not allow for suits in which causation was not present.
Even if it is assumed that the basis for implying civil liability does not re-
strict the kinds of suits which may be brought under Rule lOb-5, the absence
of causation means that there would be no a priori reason to limit the class of
possible plaintiffs to one group or another since no one would have to allege a
loss stemming from defendant's conduct. Any investor who suffered a loss
would make as good a plaintiff as any other; any limitation such as contempo-
raneity with defendant's act would be wholly arbitrary. This problem might be
avoided by fashioning recovery upon the trust principle that profits obtained by
a defendant because of the position of trust must be disgorged. Thus, it might
be suggested that a derivative action should be allowed with the insider's profits
turned over to the corporation.8" One difficulty with this suggestion is its close
correspondence to the liability already established under Section 16b of the Ex-
change Act,81 which allows for the recovery of short-swing profits realized by an
officer or director of a corporation. A strong case can be made from the legis-
lative history of this provision that only certain kinds of insider trading were
to be deterred absolutely 8 2 and that selling with inside information was to be
left to the disclosure requirements of Section 16a,8 3 which requires monthly
reports of insider trading. Even if this obstacle to a lOb-5 suit to disgorge
insider profits could be surmounted, the suit itself would involve courts in
the very difficult task of determining whether the defendant actually possessed
inside information and whether a particular transaction by an insider was
motivated by inside information or was due to other circumstances.84 Given
the ease with which such suits could be brought - the only necessary allega-
tions would be that an insider bought or sold stock and that he had inside
information - every transaction by an insider would raise the possibility
of a law suit. One can readily imagine the variety of tactics which insiders
would be forced to consider when contemplating a purchase or sale and when
considering how to defend the action. Among the more likely results of the
establishment of a suit for disgorgement would be a boom for the "strike suit"
bar and a significant curtailment of stock ownership by corporate insiders.
79. 2 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 286 (1934).
80. Cf. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTs § 205(b) (1959): "If the trustee com-
mits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with... (b) any profit made by him through the
breach of trust ... :'
81. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
8?. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and HR. 8720 Before the House Committee on Intersate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 85, 132-38 (1934) (testimony of Thomas Cor-
coran, a draftsman of the bill). Cf. Adler v. Kdawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir, 1959).
83. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and HR. 8720 Before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 134-35 (1934).
84. Just such a consideration underlies the adoption of § 16(b) of the Exchange Act.
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) (testimony of Thomas Corcoran).
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Still other considerations suggest that 10b-5 not be used as an absolute de-
terrent to insider trading with special knowledge. A decision to fashion such
an action under Rule lOb-5 will affect the entire area of federal securities
regulation and will have a strong impact on a variety of private interests.
Moreover, the repercussions on private conduct which will arise from the
creation of this form of lOb-5 liability may not be warranted by the wrong
of such insider-trading. Since no one is injured by such conduct, the character-
ization of trading with inside knowledge as a wrong may be said to be derived
ultimately from community standards of fair play and honest dealing. Yet
such notions, because they are imprecise, difficult to ascertain and not uni-
versally shared,es may not be adequate to justify judicial creation of sanctions
in a regulatory scheme directed to achieving only minimum levels of conduct
in the securities industry. In sum, the significance of the problems, the number
of private interests involved and the need to found any decision on community
values suggest that the decision to impose liability for trading with inside
knowledge be left to Congress and not be undertaken by judges in the course
of adjudication of isolated cases. Congressional action would insure the even-
handed treatment of all inside traders, which would be necessary to allow all
those concerned with the problem to regulate their conduct in accordance
with a clearly enunciated set of rules; in contrast, a judicial development of
lOb-5 liability in this area must be expected to be divergent and confusing
until uniformity is achieved by judicial review. Finally, it would only be through
the action of a representative legislative body that the variety of interests
inherent in the problem could vie for prominence, a national consensus ascer-
tained and a synthesis achieved.36
85. On the uncertainty of the business community's standards regarding inside trad-
ing, see Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businesnenf, Harvard Business Review, July-
August 1961, pp. 6, 16.
86. The recent case of Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.
N.Y. 1963), reveals the ease with which courts will avoid considerations of causation in
the search for liability. Plaintiffs were the trustees in reorganization of the Swan-Finch
Oil Co., which had been defrauded of valuable assets by the machinations of Lowell Bir-
rell. The suit was against various persons for complicity in the fraudulent acts. The court
found that there were two interwoven and indispensable transactions present, either of
which would permit the invocation of Rule lOb-5. By the first transaction, Birrell had
taken advantage of his position as an officer in the corporation to induce it to issue 578,000
shares of its own stock to him in exchange for virtually worthless consideration. The suit,
however, was not against Birrell or those persons who had caused the stock to be issued
to hint Rather, it was against persons allegedly involved in the second transaction, by
which Birrell sold the purloined stock over the American Stock Exchange. Thus the Stock
Exchange itself, its president, and various broker-members who had facilitated the sale of
the stock over the Exchange were the defendants. The court viewed both transactions as
part of "one overall scheme in which the channels of interstate commerce ... were used
for fraudulent manipulation and in which people trading in corporate securities through
the Exchange facilities were damaged." Id. at 26.
The use by the court of the rubric of "one overall scheme!' obscured the basic prob-
lem lurking in the case. By putting the ASE et al into the same category as Birrell, the
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C. Liability For Corporate Mismanagement: Ride 10b-5 and State Law
A different problem, totally removed from the definition of the elements
of a 10b-5 cause of action, has begun to plague 10b-5 suits: whether liability
should exist under the rule when the alleged wrong can be characterized equally
as a fraud or as a breach of corporate fiduciary duty by an officer or director,
The recent case of New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer 8 7 exemplifies this prob-
lem. Suit was brought in federal court under Rule 10b-5 against the
former directors and officers of the company. The suit alleged that the
defendants had used their "corporate office" to induce the corporation to invest
-in stock at an inflated price. The court held that the corporation, since it was
a purchaser and seller of the stock, could sue the officers on the grounds that
they had fraudulently induced it to enter the unprofiitable transactions. The
court was prevented from analyzing whether the defendants' acts-unlike Birrell's-were
causally related to the plaintiff's injuries. If the defendants had been co-conspirators with
Birrell prior to the time at which he defrauded the plaintiff, there would be no doubt but
that they had helped to cause the resulting damage. But Birrell does not appear to have
sought out defendants until after he had fraudulently acquired plaintiff's stock. Thus, It
appears from the facts of the case that only Birrell and the Res, a father and son who
were specialists in Swan-Finch Oil Co., were involved initially in plans to defraud the
corporation and obtain its stock with worthless consideration. Once the stock was ob-
tained, Birrell and the Res involved the stock exchange, broker-dealers, and banks as
vehicles through which the sales to the public were consummated:
Vital participants in the distribution were the Res . .. [who] utilized an elaborate
series of dummies, and dummy accounts with the broker and bank defendants to
conceal the actual source of shares being distributed, to control the flow of stock
into the market, and to create the appearance of trading activity.
217 F. Supp. at 24 (emphasis added). Only if it could be shown that the defendants were
essential to the fruition of Birrell's fraud could they be properly held responsible for the
damages sustained by the plaintiff. As defendants urged, if they were guilty of misconduct,
it was causally related only to injuries suffered by purchasers of the stock.
The fallacy of permitting the corporation to recover from the American Stock Ex-
change et al. is best demonstrated in the unjust anomalies which result. Since the cor-
poration was in reorganization, the real benefactors of any recovery would be the creditors
primarily and only secondarily the shareholders at the time of the settlement of the suit.
But from the creditors' perspective, the issuance of stock to Birrell in exchange for worth-
less consideration did not decrease the total assets of the corporation; it simply added
worthless assets. The corporation, after the issuance of the stock, comprised at least as
many real assets as before. In contrast, harm was done first to those investors who un-
wittingly had purchased the "watered" stock which Birrell was selling and second to all
other shareholders whose shares after Birrell's transactions became less valuable in terms
of the proportion of valuable assets of the corporation which they represented. By permit-
ting the corporation to bring a suit under Rule 10b-5, recovery is permitted to the wrong
class of persons while leaving many of the shareholders at the time of the issuance of stock
to Birrell and its subsequent sale to the public still uncompensated. And yet it is the in-
vesting shareholders and the investing public which "10b-5" is designed to protect, and It
is towards the investing public that the responsibility of broker-dealers and the American
Stock Exchange is directed.
87. 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Most recently, the Second Circuit seems to
have adopted a position similar to New Park and contrary to the position taken here.
Ruclde v. Roto American Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. Re,. ff 91455 (2d Cir. 1964).
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court justified this holding on the basis of an apparent anomaly. To have
barred the suit would create a situation where
... corporate officers and directors would possess an immunity from the
consequences of their fraud under Section 10-b and Rule lOb-5 which
outsiders who may have collaborated with them in defrauding the corpo-
ration would not possess.88
Since the facts of New Park would fit either a lOb-5 cause of action or a
suit based on state law for breach of the duty of corporate loyalty,0 the case
illustrates the potential overlap between federal law governing securities trans-
actions and state law governing the conduct of corporate affairs.0 0 Although
Section 28 of the Exchange Act of 1934 insures that the federal law wal not
pre-empt state law,91 it is not apparent whether concurrent avenues of relief
should be maintained or whether suits involving corporate fiduciary duties
should be excluded from Rule lOb-5, thus rendering state jurisdiction over
such suits exclusive.
On its face, the structure and the provisions of the federal securities legis-
lation indicate that this regulatory scheme was not meant to reach conduct
involving the breach of intracorporate responsibilities and duties. Rather,
federal law was obviously designed to regulate securities transactions, and
if it extends to suits of corporate mismanagement, it is only because a trans-
action in securities is somehow involved. In addition, it has been a historical
and explicit congressional policy to reject all attempts to place generally ap-
plicable federal controls on the internal workings of corporations; as a con-
sequence, Congress has repeatedly defeated bills which would provide for
incorporation under federal law.
92
Nor can it be said, as was true of state regulation of fraud in securities
transactions, that state law is inadequate to cope with the problems of corpo-
rate mismanagement and breaches of corporate fiduciary duties. Considera-
tions of federalism and due regard for the interest of the states in regulating
corporations of their own creation argue against a concurrent federal juris-
88. Id. at 266.
89. When an officer or director has been appointed by the board of directors to buy or
sell property for the corporation, any profits received by him must be disgorged under the
agency rule that an agent may not profit at his principal's expense. RESrATEl rqNr (SFC-
oND), AGENCY § 388 (1958). While difficult questions arise in situations where the officer
or director has profited by dealing with the corporation as if he were an outside party,
there is a relatively well defined body of case law on the subject See New York Trust Co.
v. American Realty Co, 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102 (1926); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del.
Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See generally LATein, Coro'oArIoNs 250-57 (1959);
BAKER & CARY, CoapoRATois 432-37, 440-60 (3d ed. 1958).
90. On the application of the state law doctrine of fiduciary duty as applied to direc-
tors and officers, see Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors, 19 B.U.L. R v. 12
(1939); Rohrlich & Rohrlich, Psychological Foundations for the Fiduciary Concept in
Corporation Law, 38 CoLua. L. REv. 432 (1938).
91. 48 Stat 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1958).
92. For a discussion of the history of such attempts, see 1 Loss, SEcuarrIEs REsuLA-
TIoN 107-11 (2d ed. 1961).
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diction which is unnecessary to cure insufficient state remedies. This policy
seems especially germane in light of the facts that Rule 10b-5 is largely a
product of judicial construction and that Congress has not clearly indicated
a federal concern with regulating internal corporate affairs. In addition, if
10b-5 suits of this nature were allowed, significant pressure might arise to
extend federal law further into the corporate fiduciary area. Thus courts
might be asked to find liability under the rule in cases which did not meet
the postulated requisites of a 10b-5 suit - e.g., foreseeability or a purchase
or sale by plaintiffs - but which involved incidentally transactions in securi-
ties.93 If this pressure were successfully asserted, the interests of the states
would be correspondingly undercut, but without a shadow of justification.
The anomaly that might arise if corporate insiders were treated differently
from others under Rule 10b-5 also seems insufficient to justify concurrent
liability under both the federal rule and state law. Initially, it might be ques-
tioned whether an anomaly exists merely because the conduct of the insider
is essentially the same as that of the outsider. The former's misdeed may be
viewed as the abuse of his corporate position and the consequent breach of
duties which the law governing the obligations of corporate officers imposes
upon him; his offense would have been the same had he taken a kickback for
buying any other kind of property at an inflated price. The outsider, in con-
trast, is charged essentially with a knowing fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities. To allow federal courts to entertain 10b-5 suits when the breach
of an insider's duty is involved would impose uniformity in treatment on
differently situated classes of defendants solely because a securities transaction
has occurred. Yet this treatment would be at the expense of treating all corpo-
rate insiders identically under state law.
Absent compelling reasons, it seems inappropriate to inject the fraud doc-
trine of Rule 10b-5 into a largely unrelated area of law where the prime con-
sideration is the fiduciary duty owed by insiders to their corporation. More-
over, the conclusion that Rule l0b-5 is an inappropriate source of relief for
corporate mismanagement also seems to apply even when the insider directly
purchases securities from or sells securities to his corporation. Thus the
scope of liability under lOb-5 should always be limited by the doctrine that
a corporation has no cause of action under the rule against its own officers,
either by direct suit or through the mechanism of a derivative action.
III. NEGLIGENT MISCONDUCT
Since an extension of 10b-5 civil suits to negligent misconduct appears
possible and perhaps imminent, an analysis of the appropriate scope of 1ha-
93. A further extension of Rule 10b-5 into problems of corporate mismanagement may
include federal suits to challenge a prospective merger in which corporate securities were
included. An attempt to bring just such a suit under 10b-S was barred in Elfenbein v.
Yaeger, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 91368 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). For cases which allege cor-
porate mismanagement under 10b-5, see Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 208 F. Supp. 754,




bility in a lOb-5 action charging negligence seems desirable. While it may
seem strange to envisage suits for negligence under a provision that has been
consistently referred to as the "anti-fraud rule," an examination of the language
of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 indicates that a suit for negligent misconduct
is not foreclosed. Section 10b prohibits "any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe .... ."94 The phrasing of the section and omission of
any specific language requiring "intention" or "willfulness" suggests that Eon-
duct may be "manipulative" or "deceptive" within the meaning of the section
without being intentional. Rule lOb-5, in turn, seems to comprehend both
intentional and negligent behavior. Section (1), forbidding the use of "any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" seems clearly to require intent ;0
Section (2), however, proscribes misleading statements without mention of
fraud or intent, and Section (3) covers action which "operates" as a fraud,
and seems concerned with the effect of conduct, not the intent with which
it is performed. In sum, Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 are susceptible to an
interpretation which would allow suits for negligence. This conclusion is
94. Securities Exchange Act § 10b, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958).
95. It is not even certain whether under Rule l0b-5 the term fraud will be interpreted
by federal courts to include intent. In some 10b-S suits courts have taken the position
that the meaning of fraud depends upon the common law jurisdiction in which it is sitting.
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1963) ; Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 56 (N.D. Ohio 1959) ; 3 Loss, Srcu-
Rrrms REGuLATiON 1435-36 (2d ed. 1961). Contra, Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786, 790
(S.D.W. Va. 1954), rev'd with disapproving dictum, 222 F.2d 464, 465 (4th Cir. 1955).
Since many common law jurisdictions have abandoned the requirement of intent in suits
charging false representations, intent may not be necessary in lOb-5 suits. See, e.g., Neas
v. Siemens, 10 Wis. 2d 47, 55, 102 N.NV.2d 259, 263 (1960) ; Preshvood v. Carlton, 162
Ala. 327, 50 So. 254 (1909); Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., 149 N.C. 273, 62 S.E. 1067
(1908).
While some courts and one treatise writer have observed that the meaning of fraud is
to be governed by the common law jurisdictions, it might be more reasonable to expect
that federal courts will see the question of the appropriate elements to a lOb-5 suit as one
of federal law. Thus, one court of appeals said of the Exchange Act:
That Act deals with the protection of investors, primarily stockholders. It creates
many managerial duties and liabilities unknown to the common law. It expresses
federal interest in management-stockholder relationships which theretofore had been
almost exclusively the concern of the states .... As implemented by Rule 10b-5
and Section 29(b), Section 10(b) provides stockholders with a potent weapon for
enforcement of many fiduciary duties. It can be said fairly that the Exchange Act,
of which Sections 10(b) and 29(b) are parts, constitutes far reaching federal sub-
stantive corporation law.
McClure v. Borne Chemical Co, 292 F2d 824, 834 (3d Cir. 1961).
Cf. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). If the area finally mate-
rializes as one of federal common law, it might be reasonable to expect federal courts to
modify the meaning of a suit for fraud. Thus, a development analogous to that which
occurred in many American jurisdictions which have rejected the requirements of fraud
enunciated in Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (1889), may occur. For a discussion of the
modifications in the doctrine of fraud, see HARPER & JAmas, LAw oF Tonrs § 7.3 (1956);
Wlliston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 1ARv. L. Rsv. 415 (1911).
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supported by dicta in several federal court decisions.00 One court, for example,
has said that
The only traditional elements of common law fraud that definitely appear
to be unnecessary under the statute are scienter - knowledge of the
falsity or misleading nature of the statement - and fraudulent intent to
mislead or misrepresent.9 7
In the light of such dicta and of the connotations latent in the wording of
Sedtion 10b and Rule lOb-5, it will not be surprising if courts, which have
always read the rule broadly, interpret lOb-5 as providing a basis for suits
alleging only negligence. 98
In establishing limitations for a lOb-5 cause of action sounding in negligence,
courts should be mindful that the principles which delimit lOb-5 liability for
intentional misconduct will not automatically suffice for negligence suits.
Some, being based directly upon the fact of intent, are simply inapplicable
when negligence is alleged.' 9 Conversely, principles desirable in negligence
suits would suggest limitations where none are appropriate in fraud suits.100
Despite this caveat, certain requirements of intentional fraud suits under
lOb-5 should be applied in the negligence context. Initially, there seems to be
no reason to abandon the requirement that plaintiff be a buyer or seller of
96. Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipulative device or contriv-
ance" in contravention of rules and regulations as might be prescribed by the Commisslozi.
It would have been difficult to frame the authority to prescribe regulations in broader
terms. Had Congress intended to limit this authority to regulations proscribing common
law fraud, it probably would have said so. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th CIr.
1961). "In an action brought under section 10(b), common law fraud need not be alleged
or ultimately proved... Rule 10b-5(b), a proper implementation of section 10(b), only
requires proof of'a material misstatement or an omission of a material fact ... to make
out a prima fade case." Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, at 212 (9th
Cir. 1962). See also Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp.
14, 23 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd to decide an issue of fact sub nor., Texas Continental Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962). Contra, Trussell v. United Underwriters,
Ltd., CCH FED. SE:c. L. REp. 1 91373 (D. Colo. 1964); O'Neill v. Maytag, CCH Frit. SIc.
L. REP. 1 91372 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
97. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd tvith approv-
ing dictum, 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963).
98. One area not discussed in the text of this Comment in which negligence suits
would appear likely is that of the relationship between broker-dealers and their customers,
It is not considered because there is no problem regarding the appropriate limits to lia-
bility. Significant in recent years has been the concern of the SEC, the national exchanges,
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) about the offering of invest-
ment advice unsuitable to a particular investor's financial requirements. It may well be
that an investor, receiving such advice from an uninformed broker-dealer, can sue for re-
scission under Rule lob-5. For examples of violations of the NASD's rules governing the
suitability of investment advice, see, e.g., Boren & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 34-6367, (Sept. 19, 1960) ; Standard Bond & Share Co., 34 S.E.C. 208 (1952).
See also Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess,, pt.
1, at 299 (1963).
99. Thus, in the Szabo case the principle that a defendant may not intentionally take
advantage of the gullibility of investors and their foolish reliance did not limit the class
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stock. Moreover, the element of causation, with its subsidiary principle of
reliance when a misstatement has been made, is equally appropriate for lOb-5
negligence suits. Similarly, those considerations which suggested that lia-
bility not extend beyond a foreseeable class of plaintiffs - the requirement
of proximate cause, in effect - are also compelling when negligence is alleged.
Positing these requirements and assuming that the defendant's conduct was
negligent, the following analysis will consider two questions: who has a duty
to be careful and who may complain of the breach of that duty?
Since a 10b-5 negligence suit is more closely analogous to the specific lia-
bility provisions of the Securities Act than is a 10b-5 fraud suit, limitations
upon 10b-5 liability for negligent conduct must take account of the functional
relationship of the rule to the relevant provisions of the 1933 Act. The Se-
curities Act and the Exchange Act may fairly be characterized as interrelated
components of a unitary federal regulatory scheme governing transactions
in securities. The two acts are intended to dovetail: for example, the Securities
Act provides for public disclosure of corporate information upon the initial
sale of securities,' 0 ' while the Exchange Act provides for periodic disclosure
once the securities have been sold to the public.' 02 Both are designed to achieve
the overall result of orderly transactions in securities, based upon the avail-
ability of accurate information. In the interest of a consistent federal policy,
it is essential that suits under the rule not be in conflict with the principles
inherent in the Securities Act and not undercut any specific liability provision
of that act. Therefore, although l0b-5 may afford a basis for negligence suits
independent of the earlier act and not identical to the specific provisions of
that act, the desirability of uniformity in federal regulation and the danger
of vitiating the regulatory scheme explicitly adopted by the Congress requires
that courts should seek to harmonize the limitations developed for lOb-5
negligence liability with the principles of limitation embodied in the Securities
Act.
At its simplest level the desirability of maintaining consistency between
suits under the rule and suits under the Securities Act suggests that 10b-5
negligence suits adopt the Securities Act's short statute of limitations. While
federal courts have allowed 10b-5 fraud suits to draw on the longer limitation
periods of the forum state, 03 the specific policy of softening the blow of civil
of potential plaintiffs. Under the rules of negligence, the result is otherwise. See text
accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
100. When considering the liability of broker-dealers for negligently prepared market
letters, remuneration to the defendant is found to be an important element in the establish-
ment of liability. Such considerations are out of context when intentional misconduct is
charged, since it would be absurd to limit liability for intentional wrongs to only those
defendants who were compensated for their bad deeds by the injured parties.
101. Securities Act §§ 5, 7, & 10, 48 Stat. 77, 78, & 81 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77e, 77g, and 77j (1958).
102. Securities Exchange Act § 12, 48 Stat. 892 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1958), 78
Siat. 565 [16 United States Code Congressional and Administratinc News 2793 (1964)].
103. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F2d 195, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1960);
Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F2d 627,
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suits on persons whose misconduct is unintentional - embodied in the time
limitations of Section 13 of the Securities Act 104 - seems equally appropriate
to a negligence suit under Rule lOb-5, and the shorter statute of limitations
should be held applicable.
A more significant policy of the Securities Act would seem to delimit the
class of possible defendants in a suit charging negligent misrepresentation.
This underlying policy appears to be that a person only has a duty of care
with regard to statements made in the course of business transactions which
yield him economic benefit. 10 5 Thus the Securities Act imposes liability only
upon people who may be characterized as having rendered services in con-
nection with the sale of securities and having been reimbursed for their re-
sponsibility to be accurate and non-negligent.100 And the act allows only buyers
- the most obvious group from whom these defendants derive profit - to
be plaintiffs. The specific limitations in the Securities Act, that only people
who buy from the defendant may sue, need not be carried over from the Se-
curities Act to Rule lOb-5 in haec verba in order to maintain consistency. So
634 (9th Cir. 1953); and Phillip v. J. H. Lederer Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. RE1', ff 91039
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). But cf. Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E,D. Pa.
1948); Montague v. Electronic Corp., 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
For a treatment which is critical of the present use of the statute of limitations under
the Exchange Act, see 3 Loss, SEcuarriEs REGULATION 1771-77, 1788-90 (2d ed. 1961).
On the more general topic of the application of laches, waiver, and estoppel to both Acts,
see Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1477 (1964).
104. Initially, the statute of limitations under Section 13 of the Securities Act barred
actions brought two years after the discovery of the untrue statement or after the discovery
should have been made with reasonable diligence, and in any event brought more than ten
years after the security was offered to the public. 48 Stat. 84 (1933). In 1934, when Con-
gress was enacting the Securities Exchange Act, the Senate introduced amendments to
the Securities Act of 1933. These amendments, passed in modified form after conference,
were designed to "liberalize the law" and prevent a paralysis in the securities business.
See, e.g., 78 CONG. Rec. 8700, 8705 (1934). Each amendment which was offered carried
with it a shorter statute of limitations. 78 CONG. REc. 8667-68 (1934) [Fletcher amend-
ment which was finally accepted 78 CoNG. REc. 8714 (1934)]; 78 CONG, REC, 8701-04
(Walcott amendment). Ultimately, the time limits presently embodied in Section 13 of the
Securities Act were accepted by both houses of Congress and enacted into law. 48 Stat.
908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958).
105. The nature of the duty of care is analogous to the duty of the land occupier to
business visitors in contrast to the duty owed to mere social licensees. See 2 HARPERn &
JAmEs, LAW OF ToRTs § 27.1 (1956). On the applicability of this analogy to advice given
about securities, see Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Mis-
representation, 24 ILL. L. REV. 749, 757-71 (1930) ; and Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Dc-
ceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HAav. L. Rv. 733, 741-47 (1929).
106. Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, liability due to misstatements in the
registration statement extends to underwriters and experts, who are directly reimbursed
for their services, present and future directors or partners, who benefit from the sale of
their company's stock to the public, and signers of the registration statement, an apparent
catchall clause. 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1958). Under Section
12 of the Securities Act, a party may only be sued by the actual purchaser of stock from
him; as a consequence, suits are allowed only when the benefit to the defendant is clear,
48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1958).
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long as the source of lOb-5 liability is distinct from the Securities Act, it is
only necessary to impose the underlying policy of restricting liability to neg-
ligence in the course of an economically motivated transaction 07
An example of the operation of this limitation on the class of possible
defendants may be found in the case of a broker-dealer who negligently pre-
pares market letters and thus dispenses incorrect or incomplete investment
advice. 08 If the person who relies upon the information buys the recommended
stock from the brokerage firm which issued the market letter, Section 12(2)
of the Securities Act explicitly authorizes a civil suit by the buyer.n '0 But
should a suit be allowed under lOb-5 for negligent preparation of a report
if the person who relies upon the misinformation buys from another broker-
age firm? Given the preceding analysis of the proper limits on liability in
lOb-5 negligence cases, the solution depends upon whether an economic benefit
was sought by the brokerage firm as a result of its distribution of the market
letter to persons such as the plaintiff. If so, it does not seem unfair or onerous
to impose a responsibility of accuracy on the defendant. Brokerage firms
clearly use market letters not only to enable prospective buyers to purchase,
but also as general means of advertising the firm's services.'10 One might
argue that it is only the sales transaction from which the defendant derives
any benefit, and the letter - wholly subservient to that transaction - can-
not be the source of any additional liability. But it is to the firm's benefit
that even investors who are not immediately prospective buyers see the litera-
ture and become acquainted with the firm's advisory services. In short, when
a market letter is distributed with the object of maintaining or establishing
business associations the requirement of economic benefit is met, and a lOb-5
suit by a potential customer who happened to buy the stock through another
firm should be permitted.'
107. If it were required that the defendant be benefited by the particular person who
is plaintiff, the requirement of privity might thereby be imposed. For the problems of
proving that benefit accrued to the defendant from the specific plaintiff, especially in a
securities market, would limit recovery to only those plaintiffs who actually transacted
business with the defendant.
108. See Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 158 (1960), for an example of SEC
action for willful misrepresentations in a market letter. On the problem of market letters
generally, see Special Study of Securities Markets, ILR. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong, 1st
Sess., pt. 1, 330-86 (1963).
109. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958).
110. For examples of advertisements in which brokerage firms offer their "market
letters" to the general public as part of their sales campaign, see Wall Street Journal,
Nov. 9, 1964, p. 29, cols. 5 & 6.
111. This conclusion is much simpler if the brokerage firm is found to have used its
recommendations to its own advantage by "scalping!' Scalping is the practice of "purchas-
ing shares of a security for [the broker's] account shortly before recommending that secu-
rity for long-term investment and then immediately selling shares at a profit upon the rise
in the market price following the recommendation." SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181 (1963). Even if such a recommendation is only negligently
misleading, the fact of scalping means that the broker profits from changes in the market
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The requirement of an economic benefit to a defendant before a duty of
care may be imposed would seem to exempt from lOb-5 liability corporations
making negligent pronouncements about the state of their affairs, absent corpo-
rate purchases or sales of stock: Without any purposeful motive to deceive, it
is hard to establish that corporations have anything to gain when they merely
report to either their share-holders or the public at large.11 2 While it might
be argued that a corporation benefits from favorable news, the benefit accrues
indirectly to the public image of the corporation and not to its business ac-
tivities in the same manner that a market letter by a brokerage firm assists
in the solicitation of business. If it were said that the release of favorable
corporate news satisfied the requirement of economic benefit, unfavorable
news would never provide the basis for a lOb-5 negligence action, and an
anomaly would be created since the duty of care would then be contingent
upon the kind of information released. Further support for the proposition
that corporations should be exempt from lOb-5 negligence suits when they
release information but do not buy or sell stock is found in the Exchange Act
itself. Under Section 18, liability is specifically imposed on any corporation
which is required to file reports and documents with the SEC if a material
fact in the report is false or misleading and the person sued "shall not prove
that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was
false or misleading."s Thus the act only imposes liability for intentional
wrong-doing with regard to documents required to be filed with the SEC;
yet these reports would usually be considered the most reliable source of
information by investors, because of their public filing with the federal regu-
latory agency charged with supervising honest disclosure. If this is the highest
degree of care which federal law imposes on the periodic reports required
by the Exchange Act, it would be a rejection of the policy of Section 18, and
strange indeed, to allow Rule 10b-5 to impose a more expansive duty on the
corporation with regard to voluntary statements.
A final element in a lOb-5 suit based on negligence is the requirement that
the plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentation be justified. From the de-
fendant's perspective, this requirement reflects the absence of any duty of care
with respect to a given class of statements: statements which purport to re-
flect the speaker's opinions and predictions, often tinged with optimism, and
thereby not serving as an adequate basis for reliance. 114 Nor would there
seem to be any reason in the negligence context to protect unreasonable re-
price induced by his market letter. The more people induced to buy the recommended
security, the higher the price will rise and the greater the profit to the scalping broker-
age firm. Since a broker derives benefit from this activity, all who buy should have a
cause of action, even if they have not purchased from him.
112. Of course, if the corporation were buying or selling stock for its own account,
the element of economic motivation might be present.
113. Securities Exchange Act § 18, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r
(1958).
114. 1 HA-E & JAwms, LANw oF ToRTs 559-80 (1956).
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liance when a corporate director makes an off-hand prediction about future
earnings or a securities salesman exaggerates in a naturally salesmanlike
fashion. To hold corporate executives liable for statements made in informal
contexts would have a potentially inhibitory effect upon the availability of
information to investors as well as upon the freedom of the executives them-
selves. Corporate executives might be loath to discuss the affairs of their
companies because of possible exposure to liability; consequently, official com-
pany reports and reports filed with the SEC might become the only source
of information to investors. But since unofficial progress reports, off-the-cuff
remarks and glowing predictions do supply investors with a ready source
of speculative information, these informal sources should not be curtailed.
Similarly, when securities salesmen engage in "puffing" or "dealer's talk,"-uu
reliance by investors on such allovable exaggeration should not be legally
compensable. This withdrawal of protection may be justified as a recognrtion
of the permissible extent of exaggeration which business ethics allow in the
sale of goods and services. While the justification for not allowing reliance
here may not appear as cogent as the justification for allowing corporate
officers a range of statements for which there is no duty of care, it would
still seem reasonable, when fraudulent intent is not present, to allow for the
harmless exuberance which is endemic to salesmen, so long as such statements
are minor in comparison to the full range of accurate information which is
supplied to the investor." With speculative information desired by investors
but generally accepted by them only for what it is worth, there would seem
to be no reason to curtail its availability by allowing negligence suits under
Rule 10b-5 to compensate plaintiffs for losses due to their excessive reliance
upon such information.
CONCLUSION
In structuring the limits of Rule 10b-5 liability, the assumed common law
reference point has been traditional principles of tort law. Yet this body of
law does not wholly reflect the changing pattern of current tort theory and
philosophy. It thus becomes conceivable that federal courts may be asked to
apply in the 10b-5 context modem tort concepts such as liability without fault,
reallocation of cost, spreading of losses, and deep-pocket theories." 7
115. Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 Fed. 853 (2d Cir. 1918); Schwit-
ters v. Des Moines Commercial College, 199 Iowa 1058, 203 N.V. 265 (1925); Nichols
v. Lane, 93 Vt 87, 106 At. 592 (1919).
116. The requirements that the "puffing" represent a small portion of the conversation
between salesman and customer and that reliable information is provided to the customer
are designed to insure that the exaggerations do not represent a material element in the
salesman's presentation. 1 HARPER & JAMEs, LAw OF TORTS 565-70 (1956).
117. See Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Prvate Law Probkm -
Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHL L. Rnv. 641 (1964) ; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YA.s L.J. 499 (1961) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES,
ToRTs 759-870 (1956).
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The initial problem in transposing such concepts into the framework of
the lOb-5 suit is that they are still not generally accepted in tort law, but
remain confined to certain relatively well defined areas of the law.118 Further-
more, underlying these modern trends in tort law are assumptions about
the proper allocation of cost and injury among members of society and the
desire, where feasible, to impose risk upon commercial enterprises and to
allow such risks to be apportioned among them by varying means including
social insurance techniques. While the appropriateness of a reallocation of
cost may be unquestioned in the field of manufacturers' warranty, such a
reallocation in the securities market raises significantly different problems.
Since risk-taking is an inherent component of any institutional system which
attempts to allocate investment funds among the variety of opportunities avail-
able, the introduction of any phase of a system of liability, which has as
its basis the reallocation of risk concepts, may distort the market's function
and operation. This is not to state dogmatically that these emerging theories
of tort law are necessarily inapplicable or unwarranted in the securities con-
text. But it should be recognized that fault doctrines, concentrating on in-
tentional or negligent conduct, provide a specific pattern of risk allocation.
Thus, brokers, dealers and other information sources are charged with the
duty to provide data to investigators which are free from deliberate falsehoods
and which, depending on its purported thoroughness, are the product of
reasonable and diligent preparation; investors, on the other hand, bear the
risks of specific but unforeseen events and general business conditions. This
allocation would seem to be in harmony with general theories of a free market
for securities and the "disclosure philosophy" of the federal securities law.
So long as these notions of a securities market remain accepted, any move-
ment in the direction of absolute liability, which may potentially cause the
broker to become an insurer of losses due to general business fluctuations,
should be suspect.
118. One example is that of extra-hazardous activities. Dixon v. New York Trap Rock
Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E2d 517 (1944); Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54
F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931). For a collection of cases, see 20 A.L.R.2d 1372 (1951). Cf. Pitw-
s a, ToRTs 519-32 (1964).
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